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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, the filing of amicus curiae briefs is at an
all-time high, having risen 800% over 50 years,1 with the Supreme
Court of the United States (the “Supreme Court”) allowing for
virtually unlimited amicus participation.2 The filing of amicus
briefs is a commonly used strategy by American public interest
*PhD Candidate and Teaching Fellow at the University of Melbourne.
LL.M. (Harvard University); J.D., B.A. (Hons), D.M.L. (German) (University of
Melbourne). Admitted to the Supreme Court of Victoria and High Court of
Australia. Email: ben.hopper@unimelb.edu.au. This article is based on a paper
written in the Cyberlaw Clinic at Harvard University’s Berkman Klein Center
for Internet & Society. I would like to extend my gratitude to Dalia Topelson
Ritvo of the Cyberlaw Clinic and Saptarishi Bandopadhyay for their
encouragement and comments, and to Lead Articles Editor, Rachael Derham,
and others on the editorial team at the John Marshall Law Review for their fine
editorial support. Responsibility for any mistakes in this article rests with me.
1. Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. REV. 1757,
1758 (2014).
2. Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends From The Crowd: Amicus
Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 195 (2009).
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groups.3 In stark contrast, after a modest rise in filing amicus briefs
in the 1990s,4 the filing of amicus briefs in proceedings before the
High Court of Australia (the “High Court”) remains very rare.5
In this article, after explaining the concept of amicus curiae
(Part II), I explore the different amicus filing trends in the United
States and Australian supreme courts, finding that,
notwithstanding a common legal heritage, the rates in the former
greatly exceed the rates in the latter (Part III). I contend that the
reasons for the difference largely have to do with the legal principle
and policy governing amicus filings, as well as, importantly, with
court procedure, legal history (the change from legal formalism to
realism that took place in the early-mid twentieth century in the
Supreme Court has simply not occurred in the High Court) and
agitation by interest groups (Part IV). I then discern the issues with
the Supreme Court’s open-door policy and the High Court’s closeddoor policy, respectively (Part V). I draw on this analysis to
construct a model designed to illustrate the ideal level of amicus
participation that courts in both examined jurisdictions should
aspire to (Part VI). This analysis leads me (i) to conclude that
reform of the amicus device is required in the Supreme Court and
the High Court, (ii) to outline the key elements of that reform, and
(iii) to find that public interest organizations should take heed of
suggested strategic implications (Part VII).

II. AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus curiae is Latin for “friend of the court”, being a person
who is not a party to a case before the court, but who assists the
court in some way. Its use was known in Roman courts,6 and, in
limited form, in French courts.7
In the English common law, from which both American and
Australian common law descend, the parties define the issues and
the evidence, on the basis of which the court resolves a dispute. In
this adversarial tradition, there is little room for non-party
participants. Indeed, the task of the court is to:
. . . determine disputes that are brought before it by parties who
3. Simmons, supra note 2.
4. Susan Kenny, Interveners and Amici Curiae in the High Court, 20 ADEL.
REV. 159 (1998).
5. Ernst Willheim, Amici Curiae and Access to Constitutional Justice in the
High Court of Australia, 22 BOND REV. 126 (2010); Jason L. Pierce, David
Weiden & Rebecca D. Gill, The Changing Role of the High Court of Australia,
PAPERS.SSRN.COM (Jan. 16, 2011), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id
=174.
6. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694, 694 (1963); S. Chandra Mohan, The Amicus Curiae: Friends
No More, SING. J.L. STUD. 352, 355-56 (2010).
7. Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae American Development of English
Institutions, 16 INT. COMP. L.Q. 1017-1044, 1017 (1967).
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appear before it, adduce evidence and make submissions . . . The
general principle is that the parties are entitled to carry on their
litigation free from the interference of persons who are strangers to
the litigation.8

Nevertheless, in an adversarial system, the parties may not
provide the court with all the assistance required to render a
decision or prevent a miscarriage of justice.9 Thus, early English
law reports cite instances of amici curiae being permitted “to
remind the Court of some matter of law which has escaped its notice
and in regard of which it is in danger of going wrong.”10 The role of
the amicus was to assist the court to fulfil the court’s duties of
supplying the necessary knowledge of the law and of “such fact,
generally accepted, as will be judicially noticed.”11 The amicus
might appear on request of the court or with permission.12 This may
be understood as an exercise of the inherent or implied power of a
court “to ensure that it is properly informed of matters which it
ought to take into account in reaching its decision”13 or to “control
its own processes.”14 It may also be understood as an exercise of the
court’s jurisdiction to act in accordance with the rules of natural
justice by allowing a non-party whose interests may be affected by
the case to be heard.15 The precise function of the amicus was never
defined in English authority. As Samuel Krislov writes, “[i]n short,
through lack of precise rules the English courts developed a highly
adaptable instrument for dealing with many of the problems that
arise in adversary proceedings.”16 From shared English common
law origins, this “highly adaptable instrument” has evolved very
differently in the United States and Australia.

8. United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR
520, 533-34 (Austl.).
9. Amici Curiae, 34 HARV. L. REV. 773-76, 773 (1921).
10. Grice v R, [1957] 11 D.L.R. 2nd 699, 702 (Can.). In like terms, Jowitt's
Dictionary of English Law defines amicus curiae as “[a] friend of the court, that
is to say a person, whether a member of the Bar not engaged in the case or any
other bystander, who calls the attention of the court to some decision, whether
reported or unreported, or some point of law which would appear to have been
overlooked” (cited in United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer
Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520, 535 (Austl.), at 535).
11. Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 773.
12. Id. at 773.
13. United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR
520, 534 (Austl.).
14. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 283 (1884) (cited in Krislov, supra
note 6, at 699).
15. Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 601 (Austl.).
16. Krislov, supra note 6, at 696.
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III. AMICUS PARTICIPATION TRENDS IN THE SUPREME
COURT AND HIGH COURT
Amicus filings in the Supreme Court have risen in leaps and
bounds since the mid-twentieth century, as illustrated in Figure 1.
In 1946, amicus briefs were filed in 21.2% of cases argued before the
Supreme Court. That percentage peaked at 46.2% in 1964, dipped
to 26.1% in 1968, and then rose sharply and steadily in the following
decades. In 2013, the percentage of cases in which amicus briefs
were filed was 95.7%. Over the decade of 2004 to 2013, amicus
briefs were filed in an average of 95.2% of cases.17
FIGURE 1: Percentage of Supreme Court cases with at least one
amicus curiae, 1946-201318

Conversely, filings of amicus briefs in the High Court are
conspicuous by their absence.
Before the 1980s, amicus
appearances were almost non-existent.19 In the 1980s, there were
a total of eleven nongovernment interveners (including amici) in
High Court cases, increasing to only thirty-six in the 1990s.20

17. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS (6th ed. 2015) (providing data on percentages
and number of amicus brief cases available in Table 7-22).
18. Id. at Table 7-22.
19. United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 19 FCR
184, 201 (Austl.).
20. George Williams, The Amicus Curiae and Intervener in the High Court
of Australia: A Comparative Analysis, 28 FED. REV. 365, 387 (2000).
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Table 1 shows the number and percentage of High Court cases
between 2010 and 2017 in which at least one amicus curiae
appeared. In this period, amici curiae appeared in only 5.5% of
cases heard before the High Court, and non-government amici (i.e.,
neither an Attorney General nor some other government person)
appeared in only 3.4% of cases. Thus, notwithstanding the apparent
heightened receptivity to amici in the 1990s,21 amici remain largely
unwelcome at the High Court.
TABLE 1: Number and percentage of High Court cases with at
least one amicus curiae, 2010-201722
Year
Amici
(No.)
Amici
(%)
Non-gov
(No.)
Non-gov
(%)
High
Court
Cases

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Total

1

4

2

5

3

3

1

5

24

2.0%

7.4%

3.3%

8.3%

5.8%

5.9%

1.9%

8.9%

5.5%

0

3

2

4

2

2

1

1

15

0.0%

5.6%

3.3%

6.7%

3.8%

3.9%

1.9%

1.8%

3.4%

49

54

61

60

52

51

53

56

436

IV. REASONS FOR AMERICAN AMICABILITY AND
AUSTRALIAN DISINTEREST
These stark differences beg the question: why do two
jurisdictions that share the same English common law heritage
have such dissimilar approaches to amici curiae? At one extreme is
a welcome attitude in which too many friends are not enough and
at the other extreme is what has been labelled “hostility.”23 In this
Part IV, I contend that the reasons for the difference largely have
to do with the legal principle and policy governing amicus filings, as
well as, importantly, with court procedure, legal history (the change
from legal formalism to realism that took place in the early-mid

21. Id. at 387. see also Kenny, supra note 4, at 159 (examining a “new
practice” in the 1990s of the High Court having “gone quite some distance along
the path of permitting non-parties to have a voice in proceedings before it”).
22. See AUSTRALASIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, www.austlii.edu.au
(last visited Jan. 7, 2018). Figures were calculated from a review of search
results in Austlii (www.austlii.edu.au/) for the period of 2010-2017. The search
was of the “Commonwealth: High Court of Australia” database with the search
operator “amicus”. The same categories of results were calculated in respect of
interveners over the same period. These additional results are on file with the
author and a copy can be made available upon request.
23. The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG, Deconstructing the Law’s Hostility to
Public Interest Litigation, 127 L. Q. REV. 537 (2011).
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twentieth century in the Supreme Court has simply not occurred in
the High Court) and agitation by interest groups.

A. History of Amici in the Supreme Court
In his 1879 “Dictionary of Terms and Phrases used in American
or English Jurisprudence,” American lawyer, Benjamin Abbott,
defined an amicus curiae as:
A friend of the court. A term applied to a bystander, who without
having an interest in the cause, of his own knowledge makes
suggestion on a point of law or of fact for the information of the
presiding judge.24

This definition comports with that of early English
jurisprudence and variations of it were repeated in American cases
at least until the 1930s.25 By the same time, however, the open
identification of an amicus brief with an organizational sponsor was
quite
commonplace,26
and
“private
organisations
were
appearing…no longer in an essentially professional relation to the
court but openly as advocates on behalf of some group or class
struggle desiring to support the contentions of a party to the
litigation.”27
Since the 1930s, amicus participation in Supreme Court cases
has trended significantly upward, apart from a brief period in the
late 1940s to 1950s, when the court sought to curb amicus filings
(see Figure 1). In 1949, the court amended its rule on amicus briefs
(historical Rule 27(9)) to place restrictions on the right to file such
briefs,28 including by stating that applications to file without
consent of the parties “are not favored” (historical Rule 27(9)(b)).29
In 1954, the court again amended its amicus rule with further minor
restrictions.30 The adoption of these rules gave rise to a significant
dispute between Justice Frankfurter and Justice Black as to the
proper role of amici. Justice Frankfurter favored the adoption of
the rules, as it would return control over amicus briefs to the
litigating parties, reflecting the traditional view of the amicus
24. BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES
USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 62-63 (1879) (emphasis
added).
25. See, e.g., Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Greathouse, 41 S.W.2d 418, 422
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931), writ granted (July 22, 1931), rev'd, 65 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933) (adopting the following definition of an amicus curiae:
“Amicus curiae has been defined as one who, as a standerby when a judge is
doubtful, or mistaken in a matter of law, may inform the court.”).
26. Krislov, supra note 6, at 703.
27. Ernest Angell, supra note 7, at 1018.
28. Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Supreme Court’s New Rules, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 20, 80 (1954); Krislov, supra note 6, at 715.
29. AMENDMENT OF RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
338 U.S. 959 (1949); Krislov, supra note 6, at 713.
30. SUP. CT. R. 42, 346 U.S. 943-1032, 993-94 (1954) (repealed 1967).
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institution as a supplement to adversarial litigation.31 By contrast,
Justice Black objected to the rules, saying:
I have never favored the almost insuperable obstacle of rules put in
the way of briefs sought to be filed by persons other than the actual
litigants. Most of the cases before this Court involve matters that
affect far more than the immediate record parties. I think the public
interest and judicial administration would be better served by
relaxing rather than tightening the rule against amicus curiae
briefs.32

As Krislov writes, this view reflects support for “a broadening
of the interests likely to come before the Court and the issues
presented to it for resolution,” allowing the amicus brief to become
“the judicial counterpart of lobbying and congressional hearings in
the legislative process.”33
Notwithstanding Justice Black’s concerns about the adopted
rule, the rate of filing of amicus briefs in the Supreme Court has
increased manifold. In significant part, this is due to the shift in
the twentieth century from the dominant paradigm of legal
formalism, where the court understands its role as declaring and
not making law, to legal realism, where the law is acknowledged to
be conditioned by its socioeconomic and political context. Under this
new paradigm, the Supreme Court became more receptive to “extralegal” facts and social science evidence, as well as to the perspectives
of interest groups.34 With the marked increase in the submission of
extra-legal evidence in the form of amicus briefs,35 “[t]oday, it can
truly be said, the Supreme Court's policy ‘is to allow essentially
unlimited amicus participation’.”36 For example, in the well-known
Supreme Court case concerning Myriad Genetic’s patent covering
isolated gene sequences associated with a predisposition to breast
and ovarian cancer,37 111 briefs were filed.38 The following
definition of amicus curiae in the most recent edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary confirms the shift of the amicus from disinterested friend
to passionate advocate: “Someone who is not a party to a lawsuit

31. Krislov, supra note 6, at 717.
32. Id. at 714-15.
33. Id. at 717.
34. Simmons, supra note 2, at 194-95.
35. Id. at 195.
36. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae
Briefs on the Supreme Court, UNIV. PA. L. REV. 743, 764 (2000) (citing Gregory
A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: Who
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 784 (1990)).
37. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct 2107
(2013).
38. Briefs as Amici Curiae, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct 2107 (2013) (the author calculated the number of
amicus briefs filed through a search of the Westlaw US database: search “133
S.Ct 2107”; then select “Filings”; then narrow by “Appellate Court Documents”;
and, finally, narrow by “Briefs”).
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but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief
in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject
matter.”39

B. History of Amici in the High Court
At least since Dixon J’s influential High Court ruling in 1930,
denying the States of Victoria and South Australia leave to
intervene,40 the High Court has displayed a lukewarm approach to
amici:
Normally parties, and parties alone, appear in litigation. But, by a
very special practice, the intervention of the States and the
Commonwealth as persons interested has been permitted by the
discretion of the Court in matters which arise under the
Constitution. The discretion to permit appearances by counsel is a
very wide one; but I think we would be wise to exercise it by allowing
only those to be heard who wish to maintain some particular right,
power or immunity in which they are concerned, and not merely to
intervene to contend for what they consider to be a desirable state of
the general law under the Constitution. . . . 41

As the data in Part III illustrate, the High Court followed this
approach with few very exceptions, the main one being
Commonwealth v Tasmania42—the celebrated 1983 Tasmanian
dam case concerning the (ultimately defeated) construction of a
hydro-electric dam on the Franklin River in Tasmania. In this case,
the Tasmanian Wilderness Society made oral submissions as
amicus on ecological issues.
The modest rise in actual, or attempts at, amicus participation
in the 1990s included the following key cases:
a. Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission:43 the High Court refused an amicus
application by the Public Interest Advocacy Centre
(“PIAC”). This followed counsel’s concession that PIAC was
not there to fill in the gaps left by other parties. PIAC is one
of Australia’s major public interest law organizations;44

39. Amicus Curiae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed.
2014) (emphasis added).
40. Sir Owen Dixon served as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia
and is widely regarded as one of Australia’s greatest jurists.
41. Australian Railways Union v Victorian Railways Comm’r (1930) 44 CLR
319, 331 (Austl.).
42. Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.).
43. Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm’n (1995) 183
CLR 245 (Austl.).
44. Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Website of the Public Interest Advocacy
Centre, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CENTER, www.piac.asn.au/ (last visited
Jan. 7, 2018).

2017] Amici Curiae in the US Supreme Court and the AU High Court

89

b. Kruger v Commonwealth:45 an Indigenous Australian
claimed damages arising from his alleged wrongful removal
from his family as a child. The Australian Section of the
International Commission of Jurists sought leave to make a
14-page submission as amicus. As Willheim writes, “[i]f
ever there was a case raising important constitutional and
public law issues, a high level of public interest and an
experienced and expert amicus applicant, surely this was
it.”46 However, the High Court refused leave on the basis
that the litigating parties were able to provide adequate
assistance to the court; and
c. Levy v Victoria47 and Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Corporation48 concerned the implied freedom of political
communication under the Australian Constitution. In those
cases, leave to appear as amici was granted to the Media,
Entertainment and Arts Alliance and the Australian Press
Council.49
In the high-profile copyright case, Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v
iiNet Limited,50 the High Court granted amicus status to four out of
six amicus applicants, but continued to evince an unwelcoming
approach, saying “where the parties are large organisations
represented by experienced lawyers, applications for leave to
intervene or to make submissions as amicus curiae should seldom
be necessary or appropriate.”51

45. Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 (Austl.).
46. Willheim, supra note 5, at 129.
47. Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 (Austl.).
48. Lange v Austl. Broad Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520 (Austl.).
49. See also Bropho v Tickner (1993) 40 FCR 165 (Austl.) (permitting an
amicus to appear and file submissions in the Federal Court of Australia on the
issue of the plaintiff's standing, but not permitting the amicus to file evidence);
and Project Blue Sky Inc. v Austl. Broad Auth. (1998) 194 CLR 355 (Austl.)
(granting leave in the High Court to eleven participants in the Australian film
and television industry to appear as amici curiae in a case relating to standards
for the Australian content of programs).
50. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited (No. 1) (2011) 248 CLR 37
(Austl.).
51. Id. at 39.
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C. Legal Principles and Policy for Amici
As others have concluded,52 the different rates of amicus
participation in the Supreme Court and High Court largely have to
do with the legal principles and policy of the courts. Rule 37 of the
Supreme Court Rules (“SC Rules”),53 which now governs amicus
applications, may be taken as the legal principle for amicus
participation before the Supreme Court. Rule 37.1 provides (in
part):
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court
relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties
may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that
does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not
favored.

This is a relatively relaxed rule and, in any case, the Supreme
Court’s policy is to admit amicus briefs.54
By comparison, the legal principle governing amicus
applications in the High Court is strict. The amicus applicant must
satisfy the court “that it will be significantly assisted by the
submissions of the amicus and that any costs to the parties or any
delay consequent on agreeing to hear the amicus is not
disproportionate to the expected assistance.”55 To “significantly
assist” the court generally requires demonstrating that the amicus
will add something different to the arguments already being
advanced by the parties.56
52. See, e.g., Willheim, supra note 5; Williams, supra note 20; Loretta Re,
The Amicus Curiae Brief: Access to the Courts for Public Interest Associations,
14 MELB. U.L. REV. 522 (1983); Kenny, supra note 4; Rosemary J. Owens,
Interveners and Amicus Curiae: The Role of the Courts in a Modern Democracy,
20 ADEL. REV. 193 (1998) (concluding that the different rates of amicus
participation between the Supreme Court and the High Court have to do with
the legal principles and policy of the courts).
53. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Effective Nov.
13, 2017) www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf (last
visited Jan. 7, 2018).
54. REAGAN W. SIMPSON & MARY R. VASALY, THE AMICUS BRIEF:
ANSWERING THE TEN MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ABOUT AMICUS PRACTICE
60 (4th ed. 2015).
55. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited (No. 1) (2011) 248 CLR 37, 39
(Austl.) (affirming Levy v Victoria, at 604-605 (Austl.)) (emphasis added).
56. Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 604 (Austl.) (“The footing on which
an amicus curiae is heard is that that person is willing to offer the Court a
submission on law or relevant fact which will assist the Court in a way in which
the Court would not otherwise have been assisted.”); see also Bropho v Tickner
(1993) 40 FCR 165, 172 (Austl.):
In Australia, as distinct from the position in the United States, the
intervention of an amicus curiae is a relatively rare event; the amicus’
role normally being confined to assisting the court in its task of resolving
the issues tendered by the parties by drawing attention to some aspect
of the case which might otherwise be overlooked.
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Former High Court Justice, The Hon. Michael Kirby, who
clearly supports an expanded role for amici in litigation before the
High Court,57 identifies four views underpinning the High Court’s
“hostile” amicus policy: (1) intervention by non-parties otherwise
than to maintain a particular right, power or immunity provided by
law is an “evil” to be avoided; (2) if there is a choice in society, it
should generally be resolved by enhancing political solutions to
public interest conflicts, rather than by unelected judges; (3) the
self-interest of parties to litigation means that they will generally
advance the best possible arguments and thereby assist the court,
but amici do not have a sufficient interest to “sharpen the
controversy” in this manner; and (4) adopting a more open policy
towards amici is a matter for the legislature, not the courts.58

D. Amicus Procedures
Amicus procedures in the Supreme Court are much more
straightforward than those in the High Court. SC Rule 37 requires
amicus applicants to obtain the court’s leave to file an amicus brief,
unless all parties have consented to the filing,59 or the brief is filed
by certain government entities (e.g., the Solicitor General of the
United States).60
The SC Rules do not stipulate time or manner requirements for
responses to amicus briefs. However, the rule that an amicus brief
in a case before the Supreme Court for oral argument be filed no
57. See, e.g., Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 650–652 (Austl.) (stating,
“this Court should adapt its procedures, particularly in constitutional cases or
where large issues of legal principle and legal policy are at stake, to ensure that
its eventual opinions on contested legal questions are informed by relevant
submissions and enlivened by appropriate materials.”); Attorney General (Cth)
v Breckler (1999) 197 CLR 83, 134–137 (Austl.) (opining in dissent that the main
industry body of the superannuation industry in Australia ought to have been
granted leave to appear as amicus, and stating, “[t]his Court should adapt its
procedures…to ensure that its eventual opinions are informed by relevant
submissions of law and by the provision of any relevant facts, not otherwise
called to notice, which can be made available without procedural unfairness to
a party.”); Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309, 313–314 (Austl.).
Opining in dissent that the Court should reserve reception of proposed
submissions of amici, and stating:
[t]he practice of this Court in recent years has moved in the direction of
widening the circumstances in which amici curiae will be heard, or at
least permitted to tender written submissions and materials . . . It has
done so out of recognition of the special role played by such courts,
including this Court, in expressing the law, especially in constitutional
cases in a way that necessarily goes beyond the interests and
submissions of the particular parties to litigation.
58. See also The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG, supra note 23, at 31-41.
59. SUP. CT. R. 37.2(a) and 37.3(a).
60. Id. at Rule 37.4.
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later than 7 days after the brief it supports gives the opposing party
time to respond in its own brief to the amicus brief.61 It also allows
the amicus to review the brief it supports and avoid repetitive
submissions.62 Thus, in general, under the SC Rules, the parties:
a. are notified of amicus filings (through the consent process);
and
b. have the opportunity to respond to amicus briefs in their
submissions.
In contrast, it has been said that the “[t]he [High] Court’s
procedures (or lack of procedures) relating to amicus applications
are so bad they are almost unworkable.”63 Even Justice Kirby
opines that “the Court’s practice may seem to an outsider to be
unpredictable and inconsistent.”64 Under the Rules of the High
Court of Australia (“HC Rules”),65 other than in constitutional
matters, there is no formal consent process (like under the SC
Rules) and no notice provisions. Even though the application may
ultimately be denied, the HC Rules require an amicus application
to be filed together with written submissions in one form.66
Similar to the SC Rules, under the HC Rules, intending amici’s
submissions must be filed within 7 days after written submissions
61. Id. at Rule 37.3(a). For the sake of comparison with the Rules of the
Australian High Court, in this section I focus on the SC Rules for amicus briefs
filed in cases before the Supreme Court for oral argument. This is because,
unlike the SC Rules, the High Court’s Rules do not specifically provide for
amicus briefs to be filed in respect of special leave applications (which, broadly
speaking, are equivalent to petitions for writs of certiorari). The High Court’s
Rules only provide for amicus briefs (under the rule for intervener’s written
submissions (Rule 44.04)) to be filed in respect of appeals (i.e., cases before the
High Court for oral argument) (Parts 41, 42 and 44 of the Rules of the
Australian High Court).
62. SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 54, at 64. The rules for amicus briefs
filed before the Supreme Court’s consideration of a petition for a writ of
certiorari are less straightforward. An amicus brief in support of a petitioner
must be filed at the same time as a brief in opposition (viz., within 30 days after
the case is placed on the docket or such later time as is called for by the Supreme
Court (SC Rule 37.2(a) read together with SC Rule 15.3)). This means that a
respondent has no opportunity to respond to amicus briefs in support of a
petitioner in its opposition brief. Nonetheless, a respondent may respond to new
matter raised by such amicus briefs in a supplemental brief (SC Rule 15.8).
63. Willheim, supra note 5, at 137.
64. Attorney General (Cth) v Breckler (1999) 197 CLR 83, 136 (Austl.); see
also Williams, supra note 20, at 389 (agreeing with Justice Kirby’s opinion
expressed in Attorney General (Cth) v Breckler that the Court's practice in
relation to amici is "unpredictable and inconsistent"); and The Hon. Michael
Kirby AC CMG, supra note 23, at 563 (stating “[m]any agree that the present
law and practice on interventions is unsatisfactory, unpredictable and
inconsistent.”).
65. HIGH COURT RULES 2004 (compilation date: January 1, 2017),
www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017C00001 (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
66. Id. at Rule 44.04.4.
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by the party in support of whom the application is made are filed
and, in any other case, within 7 days after the respondent’s written
submissions are filed.67 However, as the High Court requires
intending amici to demonstrate they have something new to add,
amicus applications are not determined until the parties’
submissions have been filed.
In practice, the High Court
determines amicus applications on the first day of the hearing or
even after the parties’ oral submissions (giving both parties the
opportunity to respond to amicus submissions). This is obviously
disadvantageous for all concerned. Intending amici must prepare
substantive submissions and parties must prepare substantive
responses, even if, ultimately, the intending amici’s applications are
denied.68
It may be inferred that the Supreme Court’s relatively
straightforward procedure for amicus applications encourages
amicus filings, while the uncertainty created by the High Court’s
relatively rigid procedure discourages them.

E. Amicus Advocacy by Public Interest Organizations
An important reason for the difference in amicus participation
is the strategy of interest groups. Interest groups in the United
States have actively used the amicus device to pursue their
advocacy goals. This can be traced to the first quarter of the
twentieth century, when interest groups, including labor unions
and racial minority groups, started filing amicus briefs.69
Subsequently, civil rights organizations increasingly relied on
amicus briefs and litigation as a means of vindicating minority
rights otherwise difficult to obtain through the political process.70
Today, American interest groups, which are numerous,71 are
active users of the amicus device. Examples include: the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), “the leading non-profit organization
defending civil liberties in the digital world,”72 whose Legal Cases
webpages list over 300 cases in which the EFF has been involved,
generally as amicus;73 and the American Civil Liberties Union
67. Id. at Rules 44.04.2 and 44.04.3.
68. Cf. Willheim, supra note 5, at 138-39. It should be noted that this
comment was made while Practice Direction No. 1 of 2000 was still in force.
Nonetheless, the comment would appear applicable to the current procedure.
69. Krislov, supra note 6, at 707; see also Simmons, supra note 2, at 193-94
(adopting Krislov’s history of private interest groups using the amicus device).
70. Krislov, supra note 6, at 710.
71. For example, the Vote Smart website, which gathers information about
political candidates and elected officials, says that its sources include over 400
national and 1,300 state special interest groups. VOTE SMART, votesmart.org/a
bout#.WlGV_1WWaUl (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
72. About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, www.eff.org/about
(last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
73. Cases, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, www.eff.org/cases (last
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(“ACLU”), which works “to defend and preserve the rights and
liberties that the Constitution and laws of the United States
guarantee,”74 and whose website lists hundreds of cases in which
the ACLU has appeared as amicus. In 2016, the ACLU filed eleven
amicus briefs, and, in 2017, the ACLU filed twenty-one amicus
briefs.75
Australia has a large number of rights advocacy
organizations.76
While a 1981 study identified thirty-four
nongovernment organizations working to promote human rights,77
by 1992, Cohen identified 462 organizations with a primary concern
relating to the protection of civil liberties.78 However, these
organizations are not active users of the amicus device. Interest
groups rely primarily on parliamentary and political processes to
achieve rights protection, rather than engaging in “judicial
lobbying.”79 For example, PIAC’s amicus webpage mentions just
three cases in which PIAC filed amicus briefs.80
Galligan and Morton write, “[a]dvocacy groups’ choice not to
use strategic litigation to advance rights claims is due in part to lack
of resources…but also to the courts’ unreceptive stance.”81 Also
significant may be the absence of a Bill of Rights in Australia,
compared with the constitutive role of the Bill of Rights in the
United States.82 While these are certainly relevant considerations,
there would appear to be ample opportunity for Australian public
visited Jan. 7, 2018).
74. Defending Our Rights, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, www.aclu.org
/defending-our-rights (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
75. Court Battles, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, www.aclu.org/defend
ing-our-rights/court-battles (last visited Jan. 7, 2018) (search conducted by
author for “amicus”; then, under “date”, the years “2016” and “2017” were
selected).
76. Brian Galligan & Ted Morton, Australian Rights Protection, Paper
presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference,
University of Adelaide, 29 September – 1 October 2004, 10 (2004).
77. Id. at 11.
78. Id. at 11-12.
79. Id. at 16-17.
80. Amicus Curiae: Lange v the ABA, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CENTRE
(Feb. 14, 2013), www.piac.asn.au/2013/02/14/amicus-curiae-lange-v-the-aba/.
81. Galligan & Morton, supra note 76, at 14.
82. Cf. Galligan & Morton, supra note 76, at 13, 17-18 (suggesting that, due
to the absence of a bill of rights in Australia, rather than relying on judicial
means to safeguard human rights, rights advocacy organizations rely on “a
range of conventional means of public advocacy and political representation
including submissions and testimony to parliamentary committees, lobbying
elected politicians and non-elected senior bureaucrats, issuing press releases,
writing guest opinion columns for newspapers, and giving media interviews”);
see also Jason L. Pierce, David Weiden & Rebecca D. Gill, The Changing Role of
the High Court of Australia (Jan. 16, 2011), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=1742024, at 3 (writing that, in the context of understanding why
constitutional cases and cases with non-party participation might not be the
most appropriate markers of case salience, it is important to note that the
Australian Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights).
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interest organizations to increase their efforts to file amicus briefs
in key High Court cases. For example, in the Myriad Genetics High
Court case, a case with high public interest, no amicus briefs were
filed (contrast this with the 111 (many amicus) briefs filed in the
Supreme Court case concerning the equivalent American patent).83

F. Conclusion Regarding Differences Between the
Supreme Court and High Court
The relative absence of amici in the High Court compared with
the Supreme Court arises from a different approach to resolving
public interest issues. In Australia, the political and parliamentary
process is seen as the predominant mode for resolving these issues.
The High Court views itself, and is viewed, through the prism of
legal formalism with its role confined to resolving justiciable
matters. Conversely, the Supreme Court is a key forum for
resolving public interest issues, in part because the Supreme Court
views itself, and is viewed, through the prism of legal realism. The
dominant position is that “strong (but fair) advocacy on behalf of
opposing views promotes sound decision making”84 and courts have
a role to play in a deliberative democratic process.85

V. ISSUES WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT
APPROACHES

Having elucidated the reasons for the differences in approach
to amici, the next steps are to consider (i) the issues with each
approach and (ii) the lessons that can be drawn from an analysis of
the issues.

A. Issues with the US Approach
While the Supreme Court has a liberal amicus policy, judges in
other American courts are less convinced of the virtues of amici.
Judge Posner has referred to amicus briefs of allies of litigants as
“an abuse” and criticized their exacerbating impact on “heavy
judicial caseloads and public impatience with the delays and
expense of litigation.”86
Nonetheless, Judge Posner’s view has not found favor with
most, who counter with the views that amicus filings (i) are part of
the deliberative democratic process, (ii) reinforce the institutional
83. D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc. (2015) 258 CLR 334 (Austl.).
84. Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 293 F.3d 128,
131 (3d Cir. 2002).
85. SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 54, at 59–60.
86. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (3d
Cir. 1997).
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legitimacy of the Supreme Court and (iii) can be extremely helpful
to generalist courts.87 In a survey of former law clerks, Kelly Lynch
concludes that the Supreme Court’s “open acceptance policy is a
reflection of the net usefulness of the amicus brief,” and that a
stricter approach could produce a “chilling effect”—“a risk that
would exceed the costs imposed by the process of review [of amicus
briefs].”88
However, scrutiny of Lynch’s evidence reveals much higher
costs than she suggests. First, 88% of the former law clerks
reported that they would give closer attention to an amicus brief
filed by a prominent Supreme Court practitioner or academic.89
This means that less well-resourced public interest organizations
might have difficulty filing an amicus brief that is considered.
Second, “the most useful information was frequently factual and
non-legal in nature,”90 and clerks repeatedly commented,
“[p]roviding social science data is one of the useful things that an
amicus brief can do for the Court.”91
This reliance on facts not tested by the parties at trial raises
especial concerns. A 1993 study by Michael Rustad and Thomas
Koenig, “The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs,”92 revealed a worrying trend, including:
a. reliance on studies funded by partisan sources with results
presented in a manner that advances those sources’
purposes;93
b. misleading presentation of empirical research (e.g., quoting
the mean but not the median of punitive damages awards
and reporting percentages without reporting absolute
numbers);94 and
c. unsupported assertions wrapped up as “social science fact.”95

87. See, e.g., Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends of the Court or Nuisances?,
33 LITIG. 5, 66–68 (2006) (arguing, inter alia, that there are at least two
important reasons why appellate courts should adopt a liberal attitude toward
the filing of amicus submissions: (i) persons with an interest in the proceeding
have a right under the US Constitution to petition the government, including
the judiciary, to redress grievances; and (ii) amicus briefs can be extremely
helpful to appellate courts); see also Ruben J. Garcia, The Democratic Theory of
Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 315 (2007) (arguing against stricter
standards for amicus participation because of its value to democratic processes).
88. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective
Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. POL. 33, 72 (2004).
89. Id. at 52, 54, 71.
90. Id. at 42.
91. Id. at 67.
92. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993).
93. Id. at 143-46.
94. Id. at 146-47.
95. Id. at 149-51.
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Allison Larsen’s review of Supreme Court opinions from 20082013, “The Trouble with Amicus Facts,”96 reveals that this trend
has, if anything, worsened since 1993. She found:
a. one in five citations to amicus briefs was used to support a
factual claim (i.e., a theoretically falsifiable observation
about the world) (e.g., in the 2012 challenge to the
Affordable Care Act, Chief Justice Roberts relied on a brief
from “American Health Insurance Plans” to assert that the
new law “will lead insurers to significantly increase
premiums on everyone”);97
b. more often than not (61% of the time), justices cite amicus
briefs to support a factual claim relying on the amicus brief
itself (and not the source relied on by the amicus), indicating
a practice of justices treating amici themselves as experts;98
c. of the 124 factual claims identified by Larsen, only thirty-five
were contested in the briefs by a party (28%) and only
thirty-three
were
contested
by
another
amicus
(approximately 25%);99 and
d. multiple instances of unreliable factual claims, e.g., claims
citing studies that the amicus funded itself.100
In a comprehensive study of amicus filings data from 19462001, “Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial
Decision Making,”101 Paul Collins reaches some fascinating
conclusions, including:
a. where access to the courts is open, diversity of interest group
representation can flourish;102 and
b. due to information overload, as the number of amicus filings
in a case increases, so too does the variability in the justices’
decision making (defined in terms of deviation from a liberal
or conservative vote). This is because, by presenting
information that might not otherwise be available to the
justices, organized interests expand the scope of the conflict
causing the justices’ choices to become more variant than in
cases with no (or less) amicus participation.103 Indeed,
Collins concludes, “amicus briefs are the single strongest
predictor of increased variance in judicial decision

96. Allison Orr Larsen, supra note 1.
97. Id. at 1762, 1778.
98. Id. at 1762–1763, 1789.
99. Id. at 1762, 1801.
100. Id. at 1790–1791.
101. PAUL M. COLLINS, FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST
GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2009).
102. Id. at 169.
103. Id. at 131–132.
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making.”104
It follows that increasing the number of voices in the Supreme
Court, while increasing diversity, also has a number of serious
drawbacks, in particular: increased reliance on untested “facts”;
increased inconsistency in judicial decision-making; repetitiveness
of submissions, and increased costs and delays.

B. Issues with the Australian Approach
The High Court’s restrictive approach is no less troubling and
raises very real concerns, including:
a. failure to recognise its role – a failure by the court to properly
recognise its role as Australia’s final appellate court and
Australia’s constitutional court,105 with the “function of
finally declaring the law of Australia in a particular case for
application to all such cases”;106
b. lack of information – the High Court is not apprised of
potentially very valuable opinions and matters and is
deprived of “the benefit of a larger view of the matter before
it than the parties are able or willing to offer.”107 The
traditional view that the Attorneys General can adequately
represent the public interest is thoroughly outmoded in
Australia’s present pluralistic society;108
c. exclusion – the voices of underrepresented and minority
groups are less likely to be accorded weight in High Court
decisions,109 which decides cases of public importance yet
has largely closed the door to public interest
organizations;110 and
d. procedural inconsistency – in contrast to the Supreme Court,
where one can consistently expect that amicus briefs will be
accepted, the amicus application process in the High Court
is “unpredictable and inconsistent.”111
Such considerations caused Justice Einfeld to opine that:

104. Id. at 173.
105. Willheim, supra note 5, at 126.
106. Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 650–651 (Austl.) (emphasis in
original).
107. Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309, 312-313 (Austl.).
108. Williams, supra note 20, at 397.
109. See generally, Loretta Re, supra note 52 (arguing that increased amicus
participation by public interest associations will help ensure a broader range of
affected interests is canvassed by the courts in Australia).
110. Williams, supra note 20, at 394.
111. Attorney General (Cth) v Breckler (1999) 197 CLR 83, 136 (Austl.). Id.
at 389.
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The variegated complexity of modern life and technology, increasing
materialism and the possible risks to the public of otherwise lauded
scientific advances, have brought consequent significant legal
challenges. These have been amplified not minimally by the
burgeoning of statutory law expressing vague general principles and
requiring the exercise of broad undefined judicial discretions. For
the just resolution of these issues, the resultant mix beckons, if not
requires, whatever assistance and expertise the Courts can
reasonably muster.112

These words, penned in 1988, are yet to resonate with the High
Court in respect of its approach to amici.

VI. HOURGLASS MODEL – ACHIEVING THE RIGHT LEVEL
OF AMICI
It would appear that there are too many voices in the Supreme
Court such that the integrity of the judicial process, the rights of the
actual litigating parties and even the aims of public interest
organizations having recourse to the Supreme Court to advocate
their causes, are being undermined. The situation in the High
Court is, as would be expected, the converse: it would appear that
there are too few voices in the High Court such that the court’s
ability to reach sound decisions that have broader social and
political implications is being undermined.
There appears to be a roughly inverse relationship between the
advantages and disadvantages of an open-door policy (with
representativeness/diversity, but also with decision inconsistency,
untested facts, costs and delay) and a closed-door policy (with
decision consistency, tested facts and expedience, but also with
unrepresentativeness).
In other words, increased amicus
participation may achieve certain goods, but only at the expense of
certain other goods and the burden of certain bads.
These goods and bads may be more specifically analyzed in
terms of five dependent variables suggested by the above analysis
that are impacted by the independent variable of number of amici:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

decision consistency;
tested factual claims;
specific expedience;
general expedience; and
representativeness.

At its simplest, decision consistency means treating like cases
alike. In other words, adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis,
which, in common law systems, serves to preserve the predictability

112. United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 19
FCR 184, 201-202 (Austl.).
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and certainty of the law. Operationalizing this variable would
involve: (i) identifying all cases in which a given precedent is raised
(e.g., the principle applying to when the state may constitutionally
curtail the exercise of religious freedom); and (ii) assessing whether
or not the principle is consistently applied to cases raising
analogous facts (i.e., is the precedent from the earlier case applied
in the same way to the latter case or is some exception/variance
observed?). The more that the court departs from precedent, the
less the consistency of the law. However, in certain circumstances,
a departure may well be justified and necessary, and may arise from
different points of view brought to the court’s attention by amici.
The analysis in Part V suggests that, as the number of amici
increases, decision consistency decreases. Conversely, as the
number of amici decreases, decision consistency increases.
Tested factual claims means the number of factual claims (i.e.,
theoretically falsifiable observations about the world) that (i) are
raised by the participants to the litigation (including parties, amici,
and interveners) and (ii) are subjected to examination by the parties
(through, for example, cross-examination or rebuttal) or which the
parties are given the opportunity to examine. These factual claims
may be divided between (i) those claims which are cited by the court
and (ii) those claims which are not cited by the court. The more the
court cites untested factual claims, the greater the potential for
unfairness in terms of parties not being given the opportunity to
respond to those claims. On the other hand, such factual claims
may be highly pertinent to the resolution of the dispute in a manner
that promotes justice not only for the parties, but also for other
affected interests.
The analysis in Part V suggests that, as the number of amici
increases, the number of tested factual claims decreases.
Conversely, as the number of amici decreases, the number of tested
factual claims increases.
Specific expedience refers to the speed and cost of resolution of
disputes, considered in terms of each individual proceeding. There
is a number of ways to operationalize these factors. Speed can be
operationalized by measuring the time between institution of
proceedings in the court and the handing down of the judgment.
Cost can be operationalized by reference to one or more of (i) cost to
the court; (ii) cost to the parties; and (iii) cost to all participants.
Specific expedience could also be operationalized by reference to the
repetitiveness of submissions. The higher the number of amici, the
greater the expected costs and delay of the proceedings. However,
that anticipated result may be mitigated by a more representative
judgment that reduces the need for re-litigation of the same
principle (considered under the rubric of “general expedience”).
The analysis in Part V suggests that, as the number of amici
increases, specific expedience decreases. Conversely, as the number
of amici decreases, specific expedience increases.

2017] Amici Curiae in the US Supreme Court and the AU High Court

101

General expedience refers to the speed and cost of resolution of
disputes, considered in terms of the aggregate of all proceedings in
the country.
General expedience can be operationalized by
reference to the extent of re-challenging of the same principle
decided by the Supreme Court or High Court in subsequent
proceedings in the country. The more that the principle and/or its
application is challenged in subsequent litigation, the lower its
“general expedience”.
The analysis in Part V suggests that, as the number of amici
increases, so too does general expedience. Conversely, as the
number of amici decreases, so too does general expedience.
Representativeness means the number and diversity of groups
or individuals whose positions are considered by the court. More
amici may indeed increase the number of positions considered by
the court. However, as indicated by the statistic cited on page 96
above that 88% of former law clerks give closer attention to amicus
briefs filed by prominent persons, this does not necessarily mean
that more amici increase the diversity of positions considered by the
court—at least, not in proportion to the number of amici. It may be
that factors in addition to increasing the number of amici are
important to ensuring diversity.
The analysis in Part V suggests that, as the number of amici
increases, so too does representativeness. Conversely, as the
number of amici decreases, so too does representativeness.
There may well not be a strictly monotonic relationship
between number of amici and each of the identified dependent
variables. In other words, if the relationship between number of
amici and a given dependent variable were individually plotted, it
may fluctuate non-monotonically. However, based on the foregoing
analysis, I predict that, as the number of amici increase, overall, the
advantages and disadvantages of the Australian “closed-door”
approach decrease, while, overall, the advantages and
disadvantages of the American “open-door” approach increase.
That is, as the number of amici increase, I expect:
a. a downward tendency in decision consistency, tested factual
claims and specific expedience; and
b. an upward tendency in general expedience and
representativeness.
These posited relationships may be visually modelled in a
graphed hourglass form, as illustrated in Figure 2 (wherein the
dotted line represents decision consistency, tested factual claims
and specific expedience; and the dashed line represents general
expedience and representativeness). In this model, I have very
roughly plotted where the Supreme Court and the High Court
would sit for illustrative purposes. Testing the claims of this model
is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that carrying out
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empirical analysis of Supreme Court, High Court and lower court
proceedings to test the predictions of the model would greatly assist
in developing policies to reach the ideal level of amicus
participation. The model in Figure 2 shows that a balance between
the Supreme Court “open-door” and High Court “closed-door”
approaches is reached at the “neck” of the hourglass. This neck
represents the “ideal” to which I submit courts should aspire.
Suggestions for policy reform to reach this ideal level of amicus
participation are explored in the next section, together with
suggestions for public interest organizations concerning their
participation as amici.
FIGURE 2: Hourglass model of effect of number of amici curiae

VII. CONCLUSION – LEGAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The analysis above leads to the following legal and strategic
implications.

A. Legal Implications
In his study of Supreme Court amicus filings, Collins posits the
following conundrum: either there are ideologically motivated
judges who will ignore or not receive amicus briefs, but render
consistent decisions or there are legalist judges who pay attention
to and receive amicus briefs, but render varied decisions “due to the
inherent indeterminacy of the law.” He calls this a “most unsettling
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tradeoff.”113 Another way of expressing this is to say: either amicus
filings are not considered (and a diversity of voices ignored) or else
they are considered (and inconsistent decisions are rendered).
However, the “Gordian knot” tied by Collins is not impervious
to cutting. Courts could, and as my analysis and model indicate,
should, adopt a “Goldilocks” policy in which the competing claims of
amici and litigants within an adversarial system are balanced. The
aim of this balancing would be an approach that encourages the
number of amici to reach the “neck” of the hourglass in Figure 2.
The highest courts in the land are more than well equipped to
engage in this balancing exercise. Thus, the approach to amicus
filers should be adjusted to, in Kirby J’s words, be neither an opendoor policy nor a closed-door policy, but a screen-door policy, “which
will keep out the pests whilst allowing genuine litigants with
arguable causes, invoking the rule of law, to engage and influence
the legal process.”114
The legal policy and principles governing amicus participation
in both the Supreme Court and High Court are clearly ripe for
reform. The key elements of reform designed to reach the “ideal”
level of amicus participation identified above include the following.

B. Reform of Amicus Rules at the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court should raise the bar for amicus
participation, instituting policies and procedures designed to
increase the quality, but decrease the quantity, of amicus
participants. These could include:
a. amending Rule 37.1 of the SC Rules (discussed on page 90
above) such that it emphasizes not only “relevant matter,”
but also the qualifications of the amicus to present that
relevant matter. For example, Rule 37.1 could be amended
to read:
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court
relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties
and which is filed by a person with suitable qualifications to
give an opinion on that matter may be of considerable help to the
Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose
burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored;

b. a rule that amicus briefs not contain factual claims, with
limited exceptions where full and complete disclosure of
methodology and underlying data is made. This rule would
reduce the incidence of untested facts;115
113. COLLINS, supra note 101, at 177.
114. The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG, supra note 23, at 3.
115. Cf. Allison Orr Larsen, supra note 1, at 1811–1812; Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 92, at 157–158.
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c. a rule that amicus applicants, within a short time after a
Supreme Court matter is set down for hearing, give notice
to the court and all the parties of their intention to apply for
amicus status, together with an indication of the matter
they intend to bring to the court’s attention.116 The notice
would be publicly posted on the Supreme Court’s website.
This would allow the Court to better “control its own
processes”117 by, for example, limiting the number of amicus
briefs on the same matter or directing amici applicants to
file a joint brief where their notices indicate an intention to
bring the same matter to the court’s attention;
d. introducing a requirement that amicus applicants
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that amicus
participation will not increase the cost and delay of the
proceeding or only do so to an extent commensurate with
the expected assistance. This proposal borrows from the
High Court principle first enunciated in Levy v Victoria
(discussed on page 90 above); and
e. to encourage representativeness, Rule 37.1 could be further
amended to encourage the filings of amicus briefs on behalf
of groups traditionally underrepresented in courts. For
example, the following could be inserted after the first
sentence of Rule 37.1 (as revised in paragraph (a) on
page 103 above): “Such amicus curiae briefs filed on behalf
of groups that generally have more limited access to the
courts by reason of indigence or otherwise may be of especial
help to the Court.”

C. Reform of Amicus Rules at the High Court
The High Court should lower the bar for amicus participation,
instituting policies and procedures designed to increase the
diversity of amicus participants without an excessive increase in
quantity (i.e., to stay within the hourglass “neck”). These could
include:
a. amending the rule on amicus participation first enunciated
in Levy v Victoria (discussed on page 90 above) as follows:
An amicus curiae applicant must satisfy the court that it is more
likely than not that it will be significantly assisted by the
submissions of the amicus and that any costs to the parties or any
delay consequent on agreeing to hear the amicus is not excessively
disproportionate to the expected assistance;

b. regulating and clarifying the procedure for making and
116. Cf. Allison Orr Larsen, supra note 1, at 1812–1813.
117. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 283 (1884); cited in Krislov, supra
note 6, at 699.
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determining amicus applications, including by:
i.
introducing a formal consent process for amicus
applicants similar to that in the Supreme Court;
ii. introducing an early notice provision like that
discussed in paragraph (c) on page 104 above; and
iii. providing for early directions hearings at which the
High Court determines amicus applications that
have not been consented to by all parties or which
it has not accepted. The hearing of amicus
applicants at these hearings would not be a matter
of right, but a matter of the High Court’s
discretion. Early directions hearings would also
allow the High Court to put a timetable in place for
the filing of amicus briefs and, if required,
replies;118
c. introducing a rule like that discussed in paragraph (b) on
page 103 above that amicus briefs not contain factual
claims, with limited exceptions; and
d. introducing a rule like that discussed in paragraph (e) on
page 104 above that encourages the filings of amicus briefs
on behalf of groups traditionally underrepresented in
courts.
While these policy reform proposals for the Supreme Court and
High Court are not comprehensive, and are subject to further
empirical analysis of the impact of number of amici, it is submitted
that they would ameliorate that impact by increasing decision
consistency, the number of tested factual claims, specific
expedience, general expedience and representativeness.

D. Strategic Implications
The key strategic implications for American public interest
organizations are:
a. exercise discernment in choosing when to file amicus briefs,
for example, by not filing in cases whose subject matter do
not directly relate to the organization’s core concerns, to
avoid developing a reputation for being a meddlesome
amicus (and incurring criticism like that of Judge
Posner);119 and
118. Cf. the various proposals for reform of the High Court rules in: The
Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG, supra note 23, at 46-48; Loretta Re, supra note
52, at 532-533; Kenny, supra note 4, at 169-171; Williams, supra note 20, at
399-402; Willheim, supra note 5, at 145–147; Owens, supra note 52. Note that
Williams and Owens endorse, and build on, Justice Kenny’s proposals.
119. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (3d
Cir. 1997).
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b. be careful about including factual claims in amicus briefs
and, if factual claims are included, fully disclose
methodology and underlying data – consistent application
of this practice will assist in being perceived as a relatively
impartial friend rather than a “pest”.
The key strategic implications for Australian public interest
organizations are:
a. actively push for amicus status in cases that affect the
organization’s core concerns; and
b. actively push for reform requiring courts to adopt a more
open policy towards amicus applicants.
By taking the steps suggested above, including further
research to test the claims of the hourglass model (see Part VI),
progress can be made towards accommodating just the right
number of amici curiae before the highest courts of the United
States and Australia.

